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Abstract 
A Group signature protocol is a cryptographic scheme that decouples a user identity and location from 
verification procedure during authentication. In a group signature scheme, a user is allowed to generate 
signatures on behalf of other group members but identity and location information of the signer is not known by 
a verifier. This ensures privacy, authentication and unlinkability of users. Although group signature is expensive 
to implement, its existential anonymity, non-repudiation and untraceablility properties make it attractive 
especially for resources-constrained devices in wireless network. A general group signature scheme usually 
contains six basic phases: setup (or key generation), join, message signing (or signature generation), signature 
verification, open and user revocation. In this paper, an evaluation of the performance of group signature based 
on three of the phases mentioned above is considered and its security in wireless networks examined. The key 
generation, signing and verification algorithms are implemented in Java 8. A proof of security of group signature 
by implication is also presented. 
 Keywords: Wireless network; authentication; security; anonymity; untraceability; group signature. 
1. Introduction 
A Group Signature (GS) scheme is a method for allowing a member of a group to anonymously sign a message 
on behalf of the group. The concept was first introduced by David Chaum and Eugene van Heyst [1] in 1991.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* Corresponding author.  
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Group signatures can be used in many privacy-preserving services and authentication schemes. Group 
signatures can be understood as a subset of attribute authentication systems which contain only one attribute 
representing a membership in a group. A user who is a member of a group can sign a message on behalf of the 
group and send the message anonymously to a verifier. According to [1], a secure group signature scheme 
should satisfy two basic requirements, anonymity and traceability. Anonymity stipulates that the identity of the 
signer should remain unknown to anyone verifying the signature including other group elements. On the other 
hand, traceability requires that there should be an entity, called the group manager, capable of revoking the 
anonymity of signer whenever necessary. Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is a variant of 
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) used extensively in a vast area of applications and across many different 
fields to verify the authenticity of messages and confirm that they have not been altered in transmission. 
ECDSA is a version of DSA using elliptic curves. ECDSA has been proven to be more effective than using 
DSA as it provides the same security with a smaller key size [2].  The two schemes (GS and ECDSA) are public 
key algorithms. Public key cryptography provides two keys for authentication. These keys are public key and 
private key. In terms of digital signatures (including ECDSA), the private key is used for creating signatures and 
the public key is copied and handed out to validate signatures. For GS, the group members each have 
differentiated private keys used for signing and a common group public key for verifying the signatures made 
available to all verifiers. Applications that benefit from group signatures are: vehicle safety communications 
(VSC) [12] system to preserve the privacy of its users, anonymous attestation (e.g. DAA-Direct Anonymous 
Attestation [13]), bidding [6], electronic cash [14], anonymous fingerprinting [15] etc. 
1.1. Properties of a Group Signature Scheme 
Group signature schemes usually provide the following properties: 
• Unforgeability - only an unrevoked group member can create a valid signature on behalf of the group. 
• Anonymity - a verifier is not able to determine the identity of a signer. 
• Complete anonymity - if an attacker obtains a valid signature and knows gpk and all keys of group 
members’ gsk[i], he is not able to determine the identity of a signer. 
• Traceability - all members can be tracked by the group manager or the revocation manager by 
member’s signed message. 
• Untraceability - any member cannot be tracked by a verifier and/or other group members by his/her 
signed messages. 
• Unlinkability - a verifier and other members are not able to link two signatures which have been signed 
by one member of the group. 
• Coalition-resistance - it is impossible to create a valid signature by a subgroup of users. 
• Exculpability - even group manager is not able to create the valid signature of a group member. 
• Correctness - every correct signature of a group member has to be always accepted during verification. 
• Revocation - a revoked member is not able to create valid signatures on behalf of the group. 
• Differentiation of group members - all members of a group must have a different gsk[i]. 
• Immediate-revocation - if a group member is revoked, his capability of creating the group signatures is 
International Journal of Computer (IJC) (2018) Volume 29, No  1, pp 82-98 
84 
immediately disabled. 
1.2. Security Assumptions of Group Signature    
One of the most critical requirements in cryptographic research is identifying (strongest and/or weakest) 
assumptions required for the construction of secure primitives. This helps to close the gap between which 
primitive is sufficient and what is necessary to build a given cryptographic function such as a group signature to 
determine the exact conditions that must be met for them to exist. 
Several implications and separations are known in literature for primitives such as standard signatures (DSA, 
ECDSA, RSA, etc.) and public-key encryption, very little is known for group signatures despite the intuition 
that the latter appears to be a stronger primitive than standard signatures [4]. 
Apart from the original work of [1], many other schemes have been proposed in the literature (e.g., [5, 6, 7]). 
Each of these has its own set of security properties and requirements. Recently, a formal model of security for 
group signatures was put forward [8], which integrated the many sets of security requirements into two basic 
categories, called full-anonymity and full-traceability. 
These two basic properties were shown to imply in the case of static groups all of the existing security properties 
of previous scheme. Formal definitions for dynamic groups were also provided in subsequent works [9, 10]. The 
significance of such formal definitions includes concrete and simpler proofs of security (only two properties 
need be satisfied) and better understanding a group signature scheme being secure with its implications. Another 
benefit is that precise relations between group signatures and other cryptographic primitives can be drawn. The 
implications proven in [4] are only possible in the presence of such formal models of security. In this paper, we 
show that the group signature cryptographic primitive is secure by implied security of the constituent primitives 
used to build the group signature scheme. 
2. Protocol Specification 
The group manager computes initialization parameters. The parameters include 
(i) H selects a random number γ ∈ ℤ and computes a group manager private  key (gmpk) computed as: 
gmsk = γ          (1) 
(ii) The group manager public key (gmpk) is given as,  
gmpk = (g1, g2, h1, h2, … hT, w)         (2) 
where given Fq a finite field with an elliptic curve E, G1 a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p and G2 a 
multiplicative group of exponent p, with some power of p as its order, g1 is a generator of G1 and g2  is an 
order-p element of G2.  The elements g1 and g2 will be selected at random as part of system setup. h1, h2, … hT 
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represent randomly selected  hj ∈ G for each interval j and w is given as w = g2γ.  
(iii) H uses the above computed parameters to generate a vector of N user’s secret keys usk and a vector of N x 
T revocation tokens (urt) for each registered user with current time intervals to ensure unlinkability as follows: 
usk = (usk[1], usk[2], …, usk[N])        (3) 
urt  = (urt[1][1],…, urt[1][T],…, urt[N][T])       (4) 
(iv)  The user secret key for N users is given as:  
usk[i]  = (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)           (5) 
Where Ai = 𝑔𝑔11/(𝛾𝛾+𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) for all i  ∈ [1,𝑁𝑁] and 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  ∈ ℤ is selected randomly.  
(v) Next, randomly selected ℎ𝑗𝑗 ∈ [1,𝑇𝑇] is used to compute the revocation token at time interval j of 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖  with 
secret key (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) as: 
Bij = hjxi     for all i  ∈ [1, N] and j ∈ ℕ       (6) 
(vi) H computes an alias for each registered user intending to roam using secret splitting mechanism from: 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑈𝑈 = (𝑤𝑤||𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻) ⊕ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈  ⊕ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻         (7) 
Where IDH is the group manager identity,  IDU  is the identity of the user, U and ⊕ is an Exclusive-Or operator. 
In the authentication phase a group signature with revocation support is illustrated as follows: 
(i) User selects a random number, 𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈 and computes 𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈𝐺𝐺 (we assume 𝐺𝐺1 = 𝐺𝐺2 = 𝐺𝐺, from bilinear map) and 
sends (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 , 𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈𝐺𝐺) to 𝑉𝑉. 
(ii) Verifier, 𝑉𝑉 selects a random number NV,   computes a session key used between 𝑉𝑉  and U as follows 
k𝑉𝑉U  = NV(𝑁𝑁𝑈𝑈𝐺𝐺)                           (8) 
and sends NV to U. 
(iii) U computes a group signature pkV1  by running group signature 𝜎𝜎  by executing the signing algorithm, 
G.Sig(gmpk, gsk[i], j, alias, NV1G) and use it to sign a message sent to V. 
It then computes a temporary alias by encrypting  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑈𝑈  given to it by group manager using its session key 
𝑘𝑘𝑈𝑈𝑉𝑉. Then it sends (alias, σu) to 𝑉𝑉. Otherwise, if the signature σV1  = 0, connection rejected. 
(iv)  𝑉𝑉 verifies the signature from U with the group manager public key, gmpk by running the verification 
algorithm, G.Ver(gmpk, usk[i], j, alias, 𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉G, 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢).   
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𝜎𝜎U = �
1, 𝜎𝜎 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣, allow 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 0, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 disallow   𝑉𝑉 allows connection if 𝜎𝜎U =1 and disallow otherwise. 
3. Group Signature Algorithms 
3.1. Key Generation Algorithm 
This algorithm takes as input integers 𝑁𝑁,𝑇𝑇 ∈  ℕ indicating the number of subscribers (users) and the number of 
time intervals, respectively.  
VLR-GS.KenGen (N, T) 
select randomly a generator 𝑔𝑔2 ∈ G2  
set 𝑔𝑔1 = 𝜓𝜓(𝑔𝑔2)  
select randomly γ ∈ ℤ𝑝𝑝  
set w = 𝑔𝑔2𝛾𝛾  
set hsk = 𝛾𝛾 
for i = 0 to N – 1 // generate  an SDH tuple (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 )  
select randomly 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℤ // 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + γ must be nonzero 
set 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔11/(𝛾𝛾+𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)  
set 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 = (𝑤𝑤||IDH) ⊕ ID𝑖𝑖  ⊕ IDH) 
for j = 0 to T – 1 // generate  time intervals for useri  
select ℎ𝑗𝑗 ∈ G // to ensure backward unlinkability  
set 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 =  ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  
set musk[i] = (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) 
set murt[i][j] = 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗   
end for 
end for 
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set hspk = (𝑔𝑔1, 𝑔𝑔2, ℎ1, …, ℎ𝑇𝑇, w) 
end 
3.2. Signing Algorithm 
The inputs to this signing algorithm are a home server public key, hspk = (𝑔𝑔1, 𝑔𝑔2, ℎ1, …, ℎ𝑇𝑇, w), the current 
time interval j, the mobile user secret key, musk[i] = (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) and a signed message    M ∈ {0, 1}* assumed to 
include all time intervals j in order to bind the signature to the interval. 
VLR-GS.Sig (hspk, j, usk[i], M) 
select randomly a generator 𝑔𝑔2 ∈ G2  
set 𝑔𝑔1 = 𝜓𝜓(𝑔𝑔2)  
compute SPK 𝑉𝑉 
select random number 𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽, 𝛿𝛿 ∈ ℤ𝑝𝑝 
set 𝜀𝜀 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼, 𝜁𝜁 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽, 𝜂𝜂 =  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 
compute T1 = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔2𝛼𝛼 and T2 = 𝑔𝑔1𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔2
𝛽𝛽,  𝑇𝑇3 =  𝑢𝑢(𝑔𝑔1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , ℎ𝑗𝑗)𝛿𝛿 and T4 = 𝑔𝑔1𝛿𝛿  
select 𝑢𝑢𝛼𝛼 , 𝑢𝑢𝛽𝛽 , 𝑢𝑢𝛿𝛿 , 𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑢𝑢𝜀𝜀 , 𝑢𝑢𝜁𝜁 , 𝑢𝑢𝜂𝜂 ∈ ℤ𝑝𝑝 //blinding factors to compute  SPK 
compute  𝑅𝑅1 =  𝑔𝑔1𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼  𝑔𝑔2𝑟𝑟𝛽𝛽,  𝑅𝑅2 =  𝑇𝑇2𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  ( 1𝑔𝑔1)𝑟𝑟𝜀𝜀( 1𝑔𝑔2)𝑟𝑟𝜁𝜁, 
compute  𝑅𝑅3 = � 1𝑒𝑒(𝑇𝑇1,𝑔𝑔1)�𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 𝑢𝑢(𝑔𝑔2,𝑤𝑤)𝑟𝑟𝛼𝛼𝑢𝑢(𝑔𝑔1,𝑔𝑔2)𝑟𝑟𝜀𝜀  
compute  𝑅𝑅4 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑔𝑔1, ℎ𝑗𝑗)𝑟𝑟𝜂𝜂 ,  𝑅𝑅5 =  𝑔𝑔1𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿 
compute  𝑅𝑅6 =  𝑇𝑇4𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  ( 1𝑔𝑔1)𝑟𝑟𝜂𝜂  
compute  c = 𝐻𝐻(𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘, 𝑗𝑗,𝑀𝑀,  𝑇𝑇1,  𝑇𝑇2,  𝑇𝑇3,  𝑇𝑇4, 𝑅𝑅1,  𝑅𝑅2,  𝑅𝑅3,  𝑅𝑅4, 𝑅𝑅5,  𝑅𝑅6 ) 
compute 𝑢𝑢𝛼𝛼 =  𝑢𝑢𝛼𝛼 + 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝛼,  𝑢𝑢𝛽𝛽 =  𝑢𝑢𝛽𝛽 + 𝑐𝑐𝛽𝛽,  𝑢𝑢𝛿𝛿 =  𝑢𝑢𝛿𝛿+ c𝛿𝛿 , 𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 =  𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 
compute  𝑢𝑢𝜀𝜀 =  𝑢𝑢𝜀𝜀 + 𝑐𝑐𝜀𝜀,  𝑢𝑢𝜁𝜁 =  𝑢𝑢𝜁𝜁 + 𝑐𝑐𝜁𝜁,  𝑢𝑢𝜂𝜂 =  𝑢𝑢𝜂𝜂+ c𝜂𝜂 
compute 𝜎𝜎 = ( 𝑇𝑇1,  𝑇𝑇2,  𝑇𝑇3,  𝑇𝑇4, c, 𝑢𝑢𝛼𝛼 ,  𝑢𝑢𝛽𝛽, 𝑢𝑢𝛿𝛿  𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑢𝑢𝜀𝜀 , 𝑢𝑢𝜁𝜁, 𝑢𝑢𝜂𝜂)  
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output 𝜎𝜎 // as the signature 
end 
3.3. Verification Algorithm 
The input to this verification algorithm include a home server public key gpk = (𝒈𝒈𝟏𝟏, 𝒈𝒈𝟐𝟐, 𝒉𝒉𝟏𝟏, …, 𝒉𝒉𝑻𝑻, w), the  
current time interval j, a revocation list 𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒋𝒋 that consists of murt[i][j] for all revoked i at the time interval j and a 
signature 𝝈𝝈 = ( 𝑻𝑻𝟏𝟏,  𝑻𝑻𝟐𝟐,  𝑻𝑻𝟑𝟑,  𝑻𝑻𝟒𝟒, c, 𝒔𝒔𝜶𝜶 ,  𝒔𝒔𝜷𝜷, 𝒔𝒔𝜹𝜹 𝒔𝒔𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊 , 𝒔𝒔𝜺𝜺 , 𝒔𝒔𝜻𝜻, 𝒔𝒔𝜼𝜼). 
VLR-GS.Ver(gpk, RLj , 𝜎𝜎 , M).  
select randomly a generator 𝑔𝑔2 ∈ G2  
set 𝑔𝑔1 = 𝜓𝜓(𝑔𝑔2)  
check SPK 𝑉𝑉 
set 𝑅𝑅1′ =  𝑔𝑔1𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼 𝑔𝑔2𝑠𝑠𝛽𝛽 (1/ T2)𝑐𝑐    // Recomputed 𝑅𝑅1, 𝑅𝑅2, 𝑅𝑅3 
set 𝑅𝑅2′ =  𝑇𝑇2𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 (1/g1)𝑠𝑠𝜀𝜀 (1/g2)𝑠𝑠𝜁𝜁  
set 𝑅𝑅3′ =  � 1𝑒𝑒(𝑇𝑇1,𝑔𝑔1)�𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 𝑢𝑢(𝑔𝑔2,𝑤𝑤)𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼𝑢𝑢(𝑔𝑔1,𝑔𝑔2)𝑠𝑠𝜀𝜀  (� 1𝑒𝑒(𝑇𝑇1,𝑔𝑔1)� 𝑢𝑢(𝑔𝑔1,𝑔𝑔1))𝑐𝑐    
set 𝑅𝑅4′ =  𝑢𝑢(𝑔𝑔1, ℎ𝑗𝑗)𝑠𝑠𝜂𝜂(1/ T3)𝑐𝑐   
set 𝑅𝑅5′ =  𝑔𝑔1𝑠𝑠𝛿𝛿(1/ T4)𝑐𝑐 
set 𝑅𝑅6′ =  𝑇𝑇4𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 (1/g1)𝑠𝑠𝜂𝜂  
if c = 𝐻𝐻(𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘, 𝑗𝑗,𝑀𝑀,  𝑇𝑇1,  𝑇𝑇2,  𝑇𝑇3,  𝑇𝑇4,𝑅𝑅1′ ,𝑅𝑅2′ ,𝑅𝑅3′ ,𝑅𝑅4′ ,𝑅𝑅5′ ,𝑅𝑅6′ )// compare with c in 𝜎𝜎 
Output “signature valid” else “signature invalid” 
for j = 1 to T //revocation check in RLj 
if  𝑇𝑇3 ≠  𝑢𝑢(𝑇𝑇4,𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗)  
output “user not revoked” 
allow access 
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else  
output “user revoked” 
deny access 
endif 
end for 
end 
4. ECDSA Scheme Algorithms 
4.1. ECDSA Key Pair Generation Algorithm 
ECDSA.KeyGen 
Input G, n // base point on E\𝔽𝔽q, n is order of G 
Randomly select d ∈ ℤ𝑝𝑝 in the interval [1, n -1] 
compute Q = dG 
set public key =  Q  
set private key = d 
output public key, private key 
end 
4.2. ECDSA Signature Generation Algorithm 
ECDSA.SignGen 
Input: d, G, n, hash function H, and message m 
Output: Signature (r; s) 
compute random integer k, within 1 ≤ 𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 − 1 
compute 𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺 = (𝑥𝑥1,𝑦𝑦1)  
convert 𝑥𝑥1 to an integer 𝑥𝑥1′  
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compute r = 𝑥𝑥1′  mod n  
If r = 0 then go to step 1 
compute H(m) and convert this bit string to an integer e 
compute s = 𝑘𝑘−1(e + dr) mod n.  
If s = 0 go to step 1 
output signature = (r, s) end 
4.3. ECDSA Signature Verification Algorithm 
ECDSA.Verify 
Input: (r; s), m, n, e, G, Q, and hash function H 
Output: Accept or reject signature (r; s) 
verify r and s are integers in the interval [1, n - 1] 
compute H(m) and convert bit string to an integer e 
compute w =  𝑢𝑢−1 mod n 
compute 𝑢𝑢1 = ew mod n and 𝑢𝑢2 = rw mod n 
compute X = 𝑢𝑢1G + 𝑢𝑢2Q 
If X = 𝑂𝑂(the point at infinity), reject the signature. 
Otherwise, convert 𝑥𝑥1of X to an integer 𝑥𝑥1′   
compute 𝑣𝑣 = 𝑥𝑥1′  mod n 
accept the signature if and only if 𝑣𝑣 = 𝑢𝑢 
end. 
5. Implementation and Results 
To implement the group signature framework developed in this paper, we analyze the group signature model 
because the model differs from conventional digital signature models including ECDSA, ElGammel, RSA 
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signature models. This difference is due to the number of parties participating in the protocol. Unlike the 
schemes stated above, group signature involves more members (group manager, group members and verifiers). 
Each member of a group can sign on behalf of a group with its identity unknown by any verifier. This requires 
each member in the group to have a different private key but use same public key. Hence there are three distinct 
processes in the scheme i.e. signing, group management, and signature verification. The group management 
function is comprised of key generation, revocation and open. So in this paper, each of the functionalities is 
handled by a specialized java class as shown in Table 2. Even though key generation and issuance, revocation, 
and opening are carried out by one entity in protocol run, we treat these operations as being as being the 
responsibility of three different servers. We implemented the group scheme in this paper using Java as a 
programming language and Eclipse as IDE and JUnit (a unit testing framework for the Java programming 
language) for testing. The tools used for the development of this project are shown in table 1: 
Table 1: Tools used for implementation 
Tool Version 
Eclipse Neon 2 
Java JDK 8 
JUnit 4 
Table 2: Java classes for the implementation 
Package Classes in Package 
groupsignature.client User.java 
 Verifier.java 
  
groupsignature.interface CommentsGUI.java 
 Main.java 
  
groupsignature.elliptic ECParameters.java 
 ECPoint.java 
 EllipticCurve.java 
 InsecureCurveException.java 
 NoCommonMotherException.java 
 NotOnMotherException.java 
 secp112r1.java 
 secp160r1.java 
 secp256r1.java 
  
groupsignature.signature RevocationCertificate.java 
 Signature.java 
  
groupsignature.server IssuingManager.java 
 OpeningManager.java 
 RevocationManager.java 
The hardware platform for testing is made up of the following configuration: a laptop with Pentium(R) Dual 
Core CPU T4400 @ 2.20Ghz, 6GB RAM, L2 cache size 4MB with 64 bits Windows 8 operating system.  
6. Group Signature Performance  
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6.1. Implementation Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: output screen 
The main interface is shown in figure 2. 
An examination of the results as can be found in the output of figure 1 showed that the different algorithms 
execution took variable amount of time. The following table shows the execution time (in milliseconds) of each 
operation. 
 
---------------Setup RevocationManager-------------- 
Execution time was 3091 ms. 
 
Rpk: 
l = 
28618984277415087468980381405350706365958128198147092158118150
19244530402203781226293766248974310733684031895750692223036133
4033308707382577701707952454397 
b = 
12227076820256716824691020899120038331567748269840674114754788
36513068097262465506602567415456141084176618347539709774315873
6244359880196917284449891444979 
w = 
20826599520353555649086734352900689240712891095424288921491498
11900389342829453633077325147829117229512499797664836129604730
1570129845964959094164537617617 
 
Rsk: 
l1 = 
15499934204221743462095252366317735609953889970968242946930054
4365506450140243 
l2 = 
18463939201509698027060399519481826085154263554782853458660874
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Figure 2: main interface 
Table 3: Operations and their execution times 
Operation Execution 
Time 
Key generation and issuance 329 ms 
Opening a signature to determine its 
signer 
172 ms 
Revocation   3091 ms 
Join (1st User) 
        (10th User) 
1735 ms 
283 ms 
Signing message to be sent 1609 ms 
verification 1515 ms 
 
It was however observed that in the signing phase, the execution times remained almost constant with negligible 
variability. The same observations were made concerning verifications of the signatures. The size of messages 
had no effect on the signing and verification times. As can be noticed from table 3, the running time of the Join 
algorithm seems to go downward as more members join the group. This is depicted in the graph in figure 3. 
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Figure 3:  Join interval plot against join algorithm execution time. 
6.2. Group Signature vs ECDSA 
We compared group signature with ECDSA signature scheme in general using the desirable security 
requirements of a digital signature scheme as discussed in section 1.1. This is shown in Table 4. 
Table 4: Group signature vs ECDSA 
Property GS ECDSA 
Unforgeability yes yes 
Anonymity yes no 
Untraceability yes no 
Traceability yes yes 
Unlinkability yes no 
Coalition-resistance yes yes 
Exculpability yes yes 
Immediate-
revocation 
yes - 
Correctness yes yes 
Revocation yes - 
 
7. Security Proof 
Suppose we have an arbitrary group signature scheme GS = (GKg; GSig; GVf; Open) with number of signers 
only two, i.e. {user0, user1}, we describe a public encryption scheme where the public key for verification is 
gpk and the secret keys for signing by user0 and user1 are gsk[0] and gsk[1] respectively. These keys are related 
to the group manager secret key, gmsk used for revocation and opening, and the group manager public key 
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gmpk. The group signature, 𝜎𝜎 is the encryption of message thus: 
M = b0b1 … bn with bi ϵ {0, 1}        (9) 
which is done bitwise. To decrypt the encryption, 𝜎𝜎 of the bit stream b, we simply verify that 𝜎𝜎 is a valid group 
signature, and if so use the group manager's secret key to recover the identity of the signer. This also applies to 
arbitrary length messages. We proof the security of group signature as implying the security of public key 
cryptography. 
Let B be an attacker seeking to break the indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) security 
of the encryption scheme A ℰ[𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺] used for encryption which results in 𝜎𝜎. We construct an adversary A against 
the group signature scheme GS such that 
𝐀𝐀𝐀𝐀𝐀𝐀𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨;𝑨𝑨𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐀𝐀−𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜(𝒌𝒌) ≤ 𝒑𝒑A(𝒌𝒌).𝐀𝐀𝐀𝐀𝐀𝐀𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆;𝑩𝑩𝐜𝐜𝐢𝐢𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢(𝒌𝒌,𝟐𝟐)       (10) 
where pA (k) means that adversary A runs in polynomial time bound. A ℰ is an IND-CPA secure encryption 
scheme assuming GS is fully-anonymous, the function on the right-hand side of the inequality is negligible. A 
runs the guess stage of algorithm B for encryption scheme A ℰ and obtains two messages m0 and m1. These 
messages, together with the state information output by B is forwarded to the choose stage of A. In this stage, A 
selects at random a position j on which m0 and m1 are different, and creates a challenge ciphertext for B. The 
challenge ciphertext is an encryption (gpk; gsk) of a word which on its first (j – 1) positions coincides with m1 
and on its last n - j positions coincides with m0, where n = |m0| = |m1|. The bit b on position j in the plaintext 
encrypted by the challenge ciphertext is precisely the identity of the player that generated the challenge 
signature 𝜎𝜎 which A received from its environment. 
Given messages m0 and m1 and  s0, …, sp denotes a sequence of p = |diff(m0,m1)| words such that s0 = m0, sp = 
m1, and any two consecutive words si -1 and si differ exactly in one bit position. More precisely, let j be the 
element of rank i in diff(m0,m1). We can construct word si from word si-1 by flipping the j-th bit of si-1, for i = 1, 
…,  p. Now, let i be the rank of the value j selected by A during the choose stage of A. Therefore, adversary B 
receives as challenge either the encryption of si-1 or the encryption of si, depending on the key used to create 
challenge signature   𝜎𝜎 . With this in mind, notice that in the experiment 𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐜𝐜𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆;𝑨𝑨𝐜𝐜𝐢𝐢𝐚𝐚𝐢𝐢−𝟐𝟐(𝒌𝒌,𝟐𝟐) (for b ϵ {0, 1}), 
adversary A successfully guesses the bit b whenever adversary B correctly identifies if the challenge ciphertext 
is the encryption of si-1 or that of si. To simplify notation, we will write B (Enc(pk, si)) for B (guess, St, 
Enc((gpk, gsk), si)). It follows from the above discussion that  
Pr[Exp𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺;𝐴𝐴ianon−0(𝑘𝑘, 2) = 1] =  1|diff(𝑚𝑚0,𝑚𝑚1)| � Pr�𝐵𝐵�Enc(pk, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖−1)� = 1�|diff(𝑚𝑚0,𝑚𝑚1)|
𝒊𝒊=𝟏𝟏
 
and 
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Pr[Exp𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺;𝐴𝐴ianon−1(𝑘𝑘, 2) = 1] =  1|diff(𝑚𝑚0,𝑚𝑚1)| � Pr�𝐵𝐵�Enc(pk, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖)� = 1�|diff(𝑚𝑚0,𝑚𝑚1)|
𝒊𝒊=𝟏𝟏
 
where the first factor represents the probability that the value j selected by A has rank i. Let p = |diff(m0,m1)|. 
We can now bind the advantage of A by: 
𝐀𝐀𝐀𝐀𝐀𝐀𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨;𝑨𝑨𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐀𝐀−𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜𝐜(𝒌𝒌,𝟐𝟐) =  Pr[Exp𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺;𝐴𝐴ianon−1(𝑘𝑘, 2) = 1] − Pr [Exp𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺;𝐴𝐴ianon−0(𝑘𝑘, 2) = 1] 
=  1p .�Pr�𝐵𝐵�Enc(pk, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖)� = 1�p
i=1
−  1p .�Pr�𝐵𝐵�Enc(pk, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖−1)� = 1�p
i=1
 
=  1p .�(Pr�𝐵𝐵�Enc(pk, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖)� = 1�p
i=1
−  Pr�𝐵𝐵�Enc(pk, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖−1)� = 1�) 
=  1p . (Pr �𝐵𝐵 �Enc�pk, 𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝�� = 1� −  Pr�𝐵𝐵�Enc(pk, 𝑢𝑢0)� = 1�) 
=  1p . (Pr�𝐵𝐵�Enc(pk,𝑚𝑚1)� = 1� −  Pr�𝐵𝐵�Enc(pk,𝑚𝑚0)� = 1�) 
=  1p . Adv𝐴𝐴ℇ,𝐵𝐵ind−cpa(𝒌𝒌) 
=  1|𝑚𝑚0| . Adv𝐴𝐴ℇ,𝐵𝐵ind−cpa(𝒌𝒌) 
We can also bind the length of 𝑚𝑚0 by the total running of algorithm A, which is some polynomial 𝑔𝑔A(. ) in the 
security parameter. As a result,  
AdvGS,𝐵𝐵anon(𝑘𝑘, 2)  ≥  1𝑔𝑔A(𝑘𝑘) . Adv𝐴𝐴ℇ,𝐵𝐵ind−cpa(𝑘𝑘) 
This gives the result claimed in Equation 10 by rearranging the terms. 
8. Recommendation 
It is a matter of utmost importance that in designing a security protocol suitable for deployment in an unsecure 
environment such as the wireless networks, attention must be given to determining the exact conditions that 
must be met for a secure protocol design. Hence there should be a remarkable distinction between what is 
known to be sufficient to construct secure and efficient group signatures (considering device limitations) and 
what is known to be necessary. This can be achieved by closing the gab existing between which primitive is 
sufficient and what is necessary to build a given cryptographic function such as encryption or group signatures. 
In this scheme, it is additionally recommended that γ should be erased from group master’s storage after the key 
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generation process and can be stored somewhere outside the group master H. This is possibly due to the fact that 
the private key is rarely used except in the case of a legal warrant for purposes of privacy revocation.  
9. Conclusion  
Group signature has been shown to be a secure primitive existentially providing anonymity, addressing 
traceability and unlinkability. Other properties of group signature found desirable in this paper include 
nonrepudiation, unforgeability, and exculpability. The main advantage of proving that the existence of secure 
group signature schemes implies public-key encryption schemes is that one can apply several of the results that 
are known for public-key encryption to the case of group signatures. However, group signature schemes have 
some limitation which is transferred to schemes using group signatures. In the event of exposure of a member’s 
signing key probably due to a compromise of the underlying storage system or human errors, this danger may 
escalate as the group size increases. 
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